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Why do people become part-time entrepreneurs? Are they credit constrained?
Previous studies on entrepreneurship do not deal with part-timers. In contrast, a
recent survey on the establishment of new businesses reports that 80 percent of nascent
entrepreneurs also hold regular wage jobs. I develop a model of entrepreneurial choice in
which individuals decide not only how much capital to invest, but also what proportion
of time to spend in business. The model allows me to test whether entrepreneurs are
credit constrained. I use a new and unique data set, which looks at how nascent
entrepreneurs divide their time between their own businesses and other jobs. My
empirical ﬁndings show that part-time entrepreneurs do not appear to be constrained.
This is not to say that no entrepreneur is credit constrained. It might be that a lot of
part-time business owners operate in less capital intensive sectors. Instead, the result
points to the marginal entrepreneur. The intuition is based upon the role of wealth.
If credit constraints are crucial, wealthier entrepreneurs should shift their time a lot
more into their businesses, because the credit constraints would have been relaxed.
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11 Introduction
New businesses often rely on individual and household wealth as a source of start-up capital,
ﬁnancial security, or insurance for acquiring funds (Gartner et al. 2004). This seems to
suggest that assets have a crucial eﬀect on the level of entrepreneurial activity. In their
seminal studies, Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (1994), and Holtz-
Eakin et. al. (1994) ﬁnd empirical evidence that entrepreneurs are credit constrained, and
that wealthy people, who are better able to obtain substantial amounts of initial capital, are
more likely to be involved in entrepreneurial activities. Hurst and Lusardi (2004), however,
show that wealth eﬀects are signiﬁcant only for the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution.
In this paper, I examine the eﬀect of initial wealth on the tendency to participate in a
business start-up for part-time entrepreneurs and argue that wealth does not signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the propensity to become an entrepreneur.
Part-time entrepreneurs are people who work a regular wage job some of the time and
work at their own businesses the other part of the time. Why are there these part-time
entrepreneurs? Why don’t they just devote all their time to their own businesses? One hy-
pothesis for the existence of part-time entrepreneurship is that people are credit constrained.
They would like to borrow enough to build their businesses and put food on the table during
the early years when the enterprise is still small and not yet generating very much cash.
If they cannot borrow, the only way they can get money to pay their bills is to work at a
regular job.
Early studies on entrepreneurship do not deal with part-timers. Instead, they use self-
employment as a proxy for entrepreneurship and focus on the selection into self-employment
and the eﬀect of diﬀerent factors on it. These studies employ data from labor market
surveys that treat respondents as either self-employed or wage workers and that do not
a l l o wt h et w og r o u p st oo v e r l a p . D ow eh a v et o worry about part-time entrepreneurs?
Recent evidence from a large cross-national study on the level of entrepreneurial activity
(Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2003 Executive Report) has established that 80 percent
2of those who implement start-ups also hold regular wage jobs. These ﬁndings conﬂict with
the theories of entrepreneurial choice in which individuals choose only between outside paid
jobs and self-employment, and in which the complexity of entrepreneurial activity is not
reﬂected.
In this study, I develop a model of entrepreneurial choice in which individuals decide how
much capital to invest and what proportion of time to spend in business. To examine the
importance of credit constraints, I estimate a reduced-form probit model. The probability
of starting a new business and wealth would be positively correlated if and only if there are
credit constraints. Wealth, however, is likely to be endogenous: what helps people become
wealthy might be the same quality responsible for their unobservable entrepreneurial talent.
To deal with wealth endogeneity, I propose a new method for instrumenting wealth. I use
month-to-month changes in the Standard & Poor 500 stock market index that serve as a
source of assets variation exogenous to entrepreneurial decisions.
I test the wealth hypothesis using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynam-
ics. The PSED is an extensive nationally representative survey of the establishment of new
businesses reporting that 50 percent of nascent entrepreneurs have full-time work and 20 per-
cent have part-time wage and salary work outside the start-ups. This new and unique data
set provides detailed information on how nascent entrepreneurs divide their time between
their own businesses and other jobs.
My empirical ﬁndings show that part-time entrepreneurs do not appear to be constrained.
In my regressions, where on the left-hand side is an indicator of either being an entrepreneur
or being a wage worker, and on the right-hand site (along with other controls) is wealth, the
wealth variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This is not to say that no entrepreneur
is credit constrained. Instead, the result points to the eﬀect of wealth on the marginal
entrepreneur. The intuition is based upon the role of wealth. If credit constraints are crucial,
wealthier entrepreneurs should shift their time a lot more into their businesses, because the
credit constraints would have been relaxed.
32 Related Literature
My theoretical model is closely related to Evans and Jovanovic (EJ) (1989). EJ present
a static model of self-employment choice where selection into self-employment is based on
entrepreneurial ability and liquidity constraints.1 They estimate the parameters of the en-
trepreneurial ability distribution and ﬁnd empirical evidence that wealth inﬂuences the ten-
dency to become an entrepreneur. EJ conclude that capital constraints are binding: those
with less initial capital are less likely to become entrepreneurs.
In an extended version of EJ, Xu (1997) replaces the static model with a two-period
model, in which individuals make occupational choices to maximize their life-time consump-
tion. Both EJ and Xu assume risk-neutrality. The two models, however, diﬀer in their
predictions about the correlation between entrepreneurial ability and individual net worth.
EJ show a negative correlation, whereas Xu argues that a negative correlation is theoretically
implausible, since entrepreneurs would accumulate capital in advance if they were to expect
ﬁnancial constraints.
Instrumental variable (IV) methods have been used in earlier studies to evaluate the eﬀect
of wealth on the propensity to become an entrepreneur. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1990)
and Holtz-Eakin at el.(1994) exploit inheritances and inherited business as instrumental
variables to evaluate the eﬀect of wealth on the probability of becoming self-employed. Both
studies ﬁnd a strong and statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. Inheritances, however, are
n o tag o o dc h o i c ef o ri n s t r u m e n t i n gw e a l t he ﬀects. For example, Hurst and Lusardi (2004)
show that both past and future inheritances aﬀect the propensity to become self-employed.
In addition, there is still an endogeneity concern regarding inheritances. Individuals who
receive inheritances might have diﬀerent talent and abilities, hence diﬀerent entrepreneurial
propensities, than those who do not receive inheritances. Hurst and Lusardi use as an
1Other empirical studies are Blanchﬂower and Oswald 1990, Evans and Leighton 1989, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian,
and Rosen 1994, Cressy 1996, and more recently Xu 1998, and Hurst and Lusardi 2004. All these studies
rely extensively on household surveys, where respondents are classiﬁed as either self-employed or wage/salary
workers.
4instrument, instead, variation in liquidity due to regional diﬀerences in housing appreciation.
They ﬁnd that wealth eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant but only for the top 5 percent of
the wealth distribution. I propose a new method for instrumenting wealth. I use month-
to-month changes in the Standard & Poor 500 stock market index that serve as a source of
assets variation exogenous to entrepreneurial decisions.
3 Theoretical Background
3.1 The Model
I extend the Evans and Jovanovic model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity constraints
by introducing part-time entrepreneurship. Once new business owners with outside jobs
are allowed into the deﬁnition of entrepreneurs, the propensity to participate in a start-up
becomes a function of individual assets, unobservable entrepreneurial ability, and preference
for participation in multiple labor force activities. I also apply the two-period extension
with endogenously determined wealth proposed by Xu. Individuals are risk neutral and
diﬀer in their entrepreneurial ability θ, which they know ahead of time.2 There is no wealth
endowment and all individuals are wage workers in period 1. At the end of period 1 they
r e c e i v ea n n u a lw a g ei n c o m ew that is divided into consumption c1 and savings z. Individuals
make occupational choices in order to maximize lifetime consumption. Entrepreneurial choice
occurs in period 2.
The period-2 income for a full-time wage worker is w+rz,w h e r er is the (gross) interest
rate. The lending and borrowing rates are assumed to be equal. The period-2 income for a
full-time entrepreneur is y(k,δ)+r(z−k).y (k,δ) is the entrepreneurial production function,
where k is the amount of capital invested and δ is the proportion of time spent in the start-
2Keeping the assumption of risk-aversion would require investigating the connection between risk attitude
and propensity to become an entrepreneur; this relationship is beyond the scope of the discussion. Kihlstrom
and Laﬀont (1979) investigate the eﬀect of risk aversion on entrepreneurial decisions in detail. The diﬀerence
b e t w e e nt h ec u r r e n ts e t - u pa n dt h et h e o r yd e v e l o p e di nt he previous section is that here entrepreneurs know
their ability ahead of time.
5up, 0 6 δ 6 1.. Individuals, however, can work in full- or part-time outside jobs and also
choose to be involved in a start-up. The total amount of hours spent in work activities is
ﬁxed and normalized to 1.
If the amount of savings is less than the capital necessary for investment, z<k ,the
entrepreneur needs to borrow additional capital, and r(z − k) is the amount of money that
he repays at the end of the period. Following EJ, I assume that an individual can borrow
only up to a certain amount, (λ − 1)z, which is proportional to his savings. λ − 1i st h e
factor of proportionality, λ > 1. The greatest amount of capital that can be invested is
z +( λ − 1)z = λz, and the constraint is 0 6 k 6 λz.
3.2 The Entrepreneurial Production Function




where k is the amount of capital invested in the start-up and α + β < 1.
There is one distinctive feature in this deﬁnition: the decreasing returns to scale. This
assumption has been employed since the general equilibrium analysis conducted by Lucas
(1978) and repeteadly reappear in Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and
Rosen (1994), Cressy (1996), Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), Gentry and Hubbard (2000).
Using data on new Japanese ﬁrms, Harada (2004) examines the validity of this assumption,
and ﬁnds empirical evidence that the entrepreneurial production function exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. This result suggests that there is a rent from entrepreneurial ability.
The period-2 net income for an entrepreneur is3
π(k,δ;θ)=θk
αδ
β + r(z − k)+( 1− δ)w
=( θk
αδ
β − rk − δw)+rz + w. (2)
3In EJ and Xu, w is not a part of the entrepreneur’s net income, because every individual is either an
entrepreneur or a wage worker, but not both.
6When δ =1 , the net entrepreneurial income becomes π(k;θ)=θkα + r(z − k), as in the
basic EJ model. For those individuals who do not choose entrepreneurship in period 2, and
who continue with their wage jobs, π(k;θ)i se q u a lt orz + w.
3.3 Entrepreneurial Decision
In the second stage, the entrepreneur’s desired investment and time spent in the start-up





β + r(z − k)+w(1 − δ)( 3 )
The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
$ = θk
αδ
β + r(z − k)+w(1 − δ) − µ1(δ − 1) + µ2δ + µ3k. (4)
The optimal solution can be an interior solution when individuals choose to be part-time
entrepreneurs, or a corner solution when they are either full-time entrepreneurs or wage
workers. Hence, there are three possible outcomes.
Proposition 1: Let π(k,δ;θ)=θkαδ
β + r(z − k)+w(1 − δ) be the entrepreneurial’s net
income, maximized with respect to k and δ, where 0 6 δ 6 1a n dk > 0. The solution
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Proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix.
Since the focus of this study is individuals who become part-time entrepreneurs, I will
proceed further with a discussion of the interior solution only, and the choice under liquidity
7constraints in the section that follows. The corner solutions of the problem together with the
eﬀect of capital constraints and the choice between full time entrepreneurship and full-time
wage work are discussed in details in EJ.
From Proposition 1, the optimal levels of capital invested and time spent in business in





























The results in (5) and (6) indicate that for those who choose to become part-time en-
trepreneurs the outside wage is inversely related to both time spent in business and capital
invested. Thus, when the outside wage increases, they will devote less time to their businesses
since the opportunity cost of time in the start-up will be higher. One possible explanation
for observing such an eﬀect of a change in w o nt h ea m o u n to ft i m es p e n ti nb u s i n e s sm i g h t
be that the substitution eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h eo u t s i d ew a g ed o m i n a t e st h ei n c o m ee ﬀect.
As a result, they will increase the time spent in the outside job.
An increase in the outside wage also aﬀects the amount of capital invested. It will make
individuals invest less capital, since less time devoted to business implies that the marginal
product of capital will be lower.
From the optimal solution for δ in (6), the amount of time that a part-time entrepreneur
spends in business is positively correlated with his ability. Or, successful entrepreneurs will
divert more time to their business than those who have less talent. Similarly, from (5), better
entrepreneurs will invest more capital, and will, therefore, save more in the ﬁrst period.
83.4 Capital Constraints
























Otherwise, the entrepreneur is constrained. By combining (??) and (8), I receive the follow-
ing condition on θ for an unconstrained entrepreneur:


















I nt h ec a s ew h e nt h e r ea r en oc o n s t r a i n t sa n dλ = ∞, (9) transforms back to the original


























The above condition holds only if the left hand side of (10) is smaller than the right hand












β is the inverse of the optimal input factor ratio. Thus, λz<w
r
α
β would be enough
to assure that (11) is correctly speciﬁed.
3.5 Occupational Choice
Individuals make occupational choices in order to maximize lifetime consumption. I assume
that every individual knows the value of his θ before committing himself. The present value
of the lifetime consumption of an entrepreneur (over two periods) is given by:
V = c1 +
θkαδ
β + r(z − k)+w(1 − δ)
r
, (12)
9where c1 = w − z is the period-1 consumption.
For an entrepreneur who is ﬁnancially constrained k = λz. Thus, V can be rewritten as:
































Thus, for ﬁnancially constrained part-time entrepreneurs wealth and ability are positively
correlated. For unconstrained entrepreneurs, V = w − z +
θk∗αδ∗β−rk∗+w(1−δ∗)
r , or there is
no correlation between wealth and ability. This result is similar to Xu, but diﬀers from EJ
who show that there is a negative correlation between ability and wealth. If individuals
know their entrepreneurial ability ahead of time and expect ﬁnancial diﬃculties, they will
accumulate funds before making entrepreneurial decisions.
One can see from Proposition 1 that the distribution of ability θ also depends on the
parameters of the entrepreneurial production function α and β. Entrepreneurs who are in-
volved in more capital intensive businesses will save more than those involved in businesses
that need a lower amount of starting capital. Thus, the amount of capital invested will diﬀer
across industries and sectors.
3.6 Empirical Implications
Using the conditions on the distribution of ability one can write the corresponding likelihood
of becoming an entrepreneur in the presence of part-time entrepreneurship and estimate the
parameters of the joint distribution of ability and wealth. The sign and magnitude of the
coeﬃcient on λ would be crucial for assessing the importance of ﬁnancial constraints.
Alternatively, one can apply a simple test of the model using reduced-form results. Under
the assumption that wealth and entrepreneurial ability are uncorrelated the theoretical model
has the following implication. The probability of starting a new business and wealth are
positively correlated if and only if there are credit constraints. An entrepreneur who is
10wealthier should shift his time a lot more into his business as a result, because the credit
constraints would have been relaxed. He can now buy machinery, feed himself and still
devote all his time to investing in his business.
4 Empirical Model and Estimation
In this section, I present estimates of the causal eﬀect of wealth on entrepreneurial propensity.
A linear approximation to the propensity to participate in entrepreneurial activities is given
by E∗
i = α
0Xi + γwealthi + εi.E ∗ is not observed, but individuals report whether they are
currently involved in the creation of a start-up. I denote Ei = 1 if individual i participates
in entrepreneurial activity, and Ei = 0 otherwise. Thus, the probability to become an
entrepreneur is Pr[Ei =1 |Xi]=P r ( εi > −α






Xi + γwealthi + εi (15)
Ei =1[ E
∗
i > 0], (16)
where ε is normally distributed.
Assuming that ε is normally distributed, the probability of becoming an entrepreneur
can be estimated as a function of wealth and characteristics X (gender, race, education,
marital status, involvement in work activities, experience, and age) using probit regression.
Wealth is likely to be correlated with the error term in the probit equation since unobservable
factors may aﬀect both wealth and the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur. One such
unobservable factor could be the individual’s ability to accumulate wealth related to some
special talent. The same ability may be responsible for starting new business. If this is true,
the error term ε and wealth are correlated.4 I use a probit instrumental variable model. The
4Similar to a linear regression, a correlation between a regressor and the error term violates the assumption
behind the nonlinear regression model.
11instrumental variable approach is discussedi nd e t a i li nt h ef o l l o w i n gs u b s e c t i o n .
4.1 Endogeneity of Household Savings
A consistent estimate of the eﬀect of wealth on the propensity to become an entrepreneur
can still be obtained if a set of variables Z that are correlated with wealth but not ε, the
error term in the entrepreneurial propensity equation, can be identiﬁed. Given Z,w ec a n
calculate the IV estimate of the eﬀect of wealth on the propensity to become an entrepreneur.
I use stock market changes as a source of assets variation exogenous to entrepreneurial
decisions. My IV method exploits the fact that the variation in savings during Wave 1 of
PSED data collection (1998-2000) captures the rapid stock market movements that occurred
in the second half of 1998. I instrument wealth with month-to-month changes in S&P500 for
the period of 1998-2000. This IV method exploits the stock wealth eﬀect, and speciﬁcally
the exogenous variations in savings and investments, as part of wealth.
One might argue that stock market changes reﬂect changes in the opportunities to become
an entrepreneur. This would happen in two cases. First, if entrepreneurial activities focus
mainly on investments on the stock market. However, the PSED covers entrepreneurs based
on strict criteria (described in the data section of the paper). According to these criteria,
individuals are included in the sample only if they spend time in functioning businesses or
are in a process of establishing such businesses, and if they invest capital in their start-ups.
Also, the entrepreneurs in the sample must have been in business for at least the past 12
months. Second, if the stock market changes cover a period of time longer than one month.
For example, individuals might have accumulated funds as a result of earlier luck on the
stock market, or alternatively, lost part of their wealth. In addition, earlier changes on the
stock market might have aﬀected the business climate in general. All these won’t aﬀect my
instrument, because I use changes in S&P500 that occur at the time of observation, and not
at the time when the start-up begins functioning. And further, the data shows that in most
of the cases the start-up (business) ideas date much earlier than 1998. Hence, the stock
12market changes from the period of 1998-2000 have no way of aﬀecting the entrepreneurial
opportunities in this case. In other words, the incidence of becoming an entrepreneur is not
correlated with the current changes on the stock market and the economy as a whole.




0Zi + ui, (17)
where (ε,u) has a zero mean, bivariate normal distribution and is independent of Z.
where X is the same set of variables that appeared in the entrepreneurial propensity
equation, and Z is the set of variables mentioned above, correlated with wealth but not with
the error term in the entrepreneurial propensity equation.
In this study, the instrument Z is the month-to-month percentage change of annual rates
in the S&P500 stock market index. Figure 5 and Figure 6 in Appendix present the S&P500
and the month-to-month percentage change of annual rates in S&P500 for the period of
1998-2004. A sharp downturn spike can be observed in the second half of 1998. There is
also a lot of variation on a monthly basis.
Changes in the stock market, as measured by diﬀerent indexes, aﬀect households’ ac-
cumulation of savings and investments (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc.). Savings and
investments, however, are part of the household net worth. The identifying assumption I
need in order to apply this instrument is that the index changes are correlated with household
savings but are not correlated with ε, the residual in the latent variable model determining
the probability to become an entrepreneur.
4.2 Estimating a Probit Instrumental Variable Model
I estimate a probit IV regression using the technique for eﬃcient estimation of limited de-
pendent variable models with endogenous explanatory variables in the presence of normally
distributed disturbances. The technique was proposed by Newey (1987). Rivers and Voung
(1987) consider the limited information simultaneous system explicitly for probit estimations.
13While the Newey method is asymptotically more eﬃcient, the Rivers and Voung approach
is a computationally simple test of endogeneity of wealth (savings). The standard errors for
probit models with IV have been corrected for estimation in the ﬁrst stage following Murphy
and Topel (1985), with the use of a two-step estimation procedure.
The Rivers and Voung procedure is as follows. Under the joint normality of (ε,u), with
variance Va r(ε) = 1 from the propensity equation, ε can be rewritten as ε = ηu + e, where
η =
Cov(ε,u)
Va r(u) , and e is independent of Z and u and therefore of s. e is also normally distributed





Xi + γsi + ηu + e (18)
e | Z,s,u ˜ Normal(0,1 − ρ
2). (19)
Estimate ﬁrst an OLS regression of s on Z and save the residuals b u, and then run a probit
equation of E on X, s,a n db u to get consistent estimators of the scaled coeﬃcients.
In the ﬁrst stage of IV estimation, household savings and investments are regressed on
the monthly changes in S&P500 and a set of exogenous covariates.5 O L Si su s e do nt h i s
stage.
A series of articles has been published (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1993, 1995) addressing
the problem of weak instruments.6 These studies focus on two eﬀects. First, a weak cor-
relation between the instrument and the endogenous variable will exacerbate any the small
sample bias associated with a correlation between the instrument and the residual in the
second-stage regression in this samples. Second, the magnitude of ﬁnite sample bias in IV
estimates approaches that of the OLS bias as the R2 between the endogenous variable and
5Even though the second ﬁgure in Appendix 1 is given in percentage changes, the estimation in the ﬁrst stage
is based on changes only.
6The studies that I mention here are speciﬁcally designed for linear models. However, they can still be used
to evaluate the quality of instruments from the ﬁrst stage of IV estimation, where OLS is used to regress
savings and investments on the instruments.
14the instruments approaches zero. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker suggest that the R2 and the
F-statistics from the ﬁrst stage of IV estimation be reported as approximate guides to the
quality of the IV estimates. According to Staiger and Stock (1997), a value of 10 can be used
as an approximation for the F-statistic associated with the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
on the instruments in the ﬁrst-stage regression of IV are jointly zero.
In the second stage, I estimate a probit model with a dependent variable that equals one
for respondents identiﬁed as entrepreneurs and zero for the control group. The right-hand
side includes savings and investments, the ﬁtted residual from the ﬁrst stage, and a set of
demographic characteristics. The regressors from the second stage of IV are also included in
the ﬁrst stage. Including the ﬁtted residuals from the ﬁrst stage requires a standard errors
correction as mentioned above, since the residual is an estimate.
5 Data: Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
The empirical estimation is performed on data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial
Dynamics (PSED), an extensive nationally representative survey of the establishment of
new businesses. The PSED provides several innovations over previous data sets. First, the
data were speciﬁcally created to follow both nascent entrepreneurs and start-ups. Nascent
entrepreneurs are selected based on three criteria: being involved in a start-up for the past
12 months, expecting to be at least partial owners of the business, and functioning in a
gestation phase of the business. The third criterion determines whether “the start-up has a
positive cash-ﬂow that covers expenses and the owner-manager salaries for more than three
months.” Respondents with a positive cash-ﬂow for more than three months are excluded.
Second, start-ups are followed for a period of four years. In this way we can observe
the eﬀect of wealth and initial capital on the start-ups’ performance and the rate of en-
trepreneurial survival. Third, every PSED wave includes observations that are made during
a period of two to three consecutive years. For example, the Wave 1 data collection starts in
July 1998 and ends in 2000; some respondents are interviewed in 1998, others in 1999, and
15a small portion is observed in 2000. This is beneﬁcial for the analysis, since it allows taking
advantage of the stock market changes over a longer period of time.
The PSED, designed to represent the entire population of entrepreneurs, consists of 830
nascent entrepreneurs and 431 comparison group members. The sample is randomly selected
after an 8-month preliminary screening of 64,622 individuals at least 18 years old. Women,
Blacks and Hispanics are oversampled. After the initial screening, two representative samples
are identiﬁed. A sample of those attempting to start a new business is identiﬁed based on
the criteria described above. A second representative sample of typical adults, a control
group, is constructed as well. The next stage of data collection is the completion of phone
interviews and mail questionnaires by both groups. The last stage is a 12- and 24-month
follow-up phone interview and a mail questionnaire completed only by the entrepreneurs. In
this study I use data from Wave 1, which is completed between 1998 and 2000. Wave 2 is
the ﬁrst follow-up completed 12 months after Wave 1. Wave 3 is the second follow-up, after
24 months. Four waves have currently been completed.






Mean  Stand. Deviation 
 
 Age  40.1  (12.5) 
 White  0.762  (0.426) 
 Male  0.570  (0.495) 
 Education     
       Less than high school  0.035  (0.185) 
       High school  0.233  (0.423) 
       Some college  0.374  (0.484) 
       College or more  0.356  (0.479) 
 Married  0.649  (0.477) 
 Experience  17.6  (11.2) 
 Outside  job  0.920  (0.272) 
 Entrepreneur  0.629  (0.483) 
  HH Net Worth x 10
-6 0.206  (0.659) 
 HH  Income  x 10
-6 0.056  (0.062) 
  HH Sav. & Inv. x 10-6  0.059  (0.237) 
      
Source: PSED Wave1, Economod  
Number of observations is 1,052. 
 
16Summary statistics of the variables used in the study are presented in Tables 1 through
3. The data are described in detail in Gartner et al. (2004). The PSED sample weights are
used in all estimations described in this paper.
I identify multiple work activities for every respondent: full-time work, part-time work,
b u s i n e s so w n e ro rs e l f - e m p l o y e d ,o rm a n a g e ro fb u s i n e s so w n e db yo t h e r s . T h e r ei sa n
interesting variation between nascent entrepreneurs and members of the control group. Both
groups report that paid work dominates their time on workdays. However, “Personal time
with spouse, others” is the third largest use of time for nascent entrepreneurs, whereas
members of the control group report “reading,T V ,s p o r t s ,r e c r e a t i o n ,a n dh o b b i e s ,g o i n g
out” as their third largest use7.
  Table 2 Time Allocation in a Workday (hours) 
 Mean  SD 
Entrepreneurs    
   All work for pay, including travel  6.96  4.05 
   Working on a new business start-up  2.05  2.77 
   Reading, TV, sports, recreation, hobbies etc.  1.49  1.33 
   Personal time with spouse, others  1.69  1.36 
Control group    
   All work for pay, including travel  7.13  3.98 
   Working on a new business start-up  -  - 
   Reading, TV, sports, recreation, hobbies etc.  1.89  1.46 
   Personal time with spouse, others  1.79  2.00 
Source: PSED Wave1 
Sleeping is given the second most time during workdays  
 
The sample consists of 1,052 observations. Approximately 63 percent of the sample are
entrepreneurs, and 92 percent hold jobs, regardless of being involved in a start-up. The
average age is 40 years, which puts the respondents right in the middle of their life-cycle
earnings proﬁle. The average number of years of paid work experience is 17, including both
7Sleeping is given the second most time.
17full- and part-time jobs. The education variable is constructed in terms of levels of schooling
completed, the lowest being up to eighth grade and the highest LLB, MD, PhD, or EDD
degree. The average respondent has some college experience.
5.1 Are Entrepreneurs Wealthier?
Table 3 gives summary statistics for household income and household wealth for nascent
entrepreneurs and the control group separately. Household income includes all sources of
income such as work, government beneﬁts, and pensions before taxes in the previous year.
Income is in relative ﬁgures. The diﬀerence between the average household incomes of the
two groups is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
  Table 3 Household Income and Wealth 
 Mean  Median  SE 
Household Income  55,869 40,230  1,921 
  Nascent Entrepreneurs  56,883  42,800  2,771 
  Control Group  54,147  31,078  2,150 
Household Wealth  205,967 55,759  20,294 
  Nascent Entrepreneurs  215,308  59,220  29,237 
  Control Group  190,097  49,103  22,854 
Source: PSED Wave1       
 
The PSED questions on net worth are modeled after the questions from the Survey of
Consumer Finances. Three separate approaches are used for the collection of data on house-
hold net worth. First, respondents report a wealth component measured in ﬁve categories:
current value of home; mortgages or land contracts on the home; tangible assets, savings,
and investments (current value of stocks, bonds, mutual funds, saving accounts, checking ac-
counts, retirement accounts, etc.); and other debts and land contracts. Second, respondents
report a single wealth value, which is an approximation of the current household net worth.
Third, categorical wealth values are reported. Signiﬁcantly more variation is observed in the
household wealth. The average and median levels of wealth are higher for entrepreneurs than
18for the members of the control group. Also, the average amount of savings and investments
from Table 1 is $59,000, which is approximately one-fourth of the household wealth.
5.2 Where Are The Part-Timers?
The economic sector of the start-ups covered by the PSED is very similar to the existing US
business with employees. Gartner et al. (2004, p. 248) compare the 1997-1999 PSED sample
with the US business population. They use two sources of business description by sector: the
population of all ﬁrms (5.5 mil. in 1998) with employees developed by the Census Bureau of
the Department of Commerce and the annual counts of business tax returns assembled by
the Internal Revenue Service.
Gartner et al. show that there is a correspondence between the three sources, and that
in most of the cases the sector percentage falls in the range between the employee ﬁrms and
the tax return data. This result seems to be appropriate since the PSED covers mainly sole
proprietorships and ﬁrms that will hire employees in the future. The only exceptions are
retail trade and information sectors where the number of start-ups is disproportionately high;
and the ﬁnance and insurance, health care and social assistance, and the accommodation
and foot services with a low percentage of start-ups reported. These diﬀerences come from
the fact that the PSED covers essentially start-ups, while the other two descriptions reﬂect
operating businesses. In general, however, the start-up eﬀorts seem to reﬂect the existing
business activity.
I divide the sample of nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED into two groups based on the
time they spend in their start-ups. Those who devote 35 hours per week and more are full-
time entrepreneurs. The rest form the group of the part-timers. Similarly to Gartner et al.,
I use both the US Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC 1987) and the North American
Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS 1997). The results are presented on Figure 3 and
Figure 4 in Appendix8.
8There are only 9 sectors on Figure 4, eventhough under the SIC 1987 classiﬁcation there are 10 of them.
Since there are no start-up in Mining, I do not show it on the graph.
19The diﬀerences in sector orientation between full- and part-time entrepreneurs are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshing; construction;
manufacturing; transportation and communication; and business services. There are rela-
tively less part-timers than full-time entrepreneurs in agriculture, construction, and trans-
portation, while the opposite holds for business services and manufacturing. This result
supports the prediction of my theoretical model. Manufacturing is a sector where returns
need a longer period of time and where individuals’ expectations on ability are updated at
a lower pace.
Figure 3 where the start-ups are plotted across 20 sectors provides a conﬁrmation of
the above discussion. The diﬀerences in agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshing; construction;
manufacturing are even more distinctive. In addition, there are two more sectors where
the number of part-timers is disproportionately high: professional, scientiﬁc, and technical
services; and information.
6 Empirical Results
For comparison, I ﬁrst estimate the model without the instrumental variable included. The
results presented in Table 4 show that the coeﬃcient on wealth is zero and not statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The transformation of results is done at both the mean
and the median.
I next present the two-stage estimation. The estimates from stage one are reported in
Table 5. The dependent variable, household net worth, is regressed on monthly change in
S&P500, household savings and investments, an interaction term of the monthly changes and
savings and investments, number of outside labor market activities (start-ups not included),
a dummy variable for jobs, race, and gender; years of education, experience, and age; and
dummies for marriage and divorce.
20Table 4 Probit Estimates of Entrepreneurial Propensity
* 




at the mean 
(2) 
at the median 
Wealth 0.000  0.000 




 (0.029)  (0.031) 
Job   0.181
*   0.184
* 




 (0.031)  (0.034) 
Male   0.143
*   0.143
* 
 (0.035)  (0.035) 
Education 0.011  0.011 
 (0.009)  (0.009) 
Married   0.107
*   0.112
* 
 (0.041)  (0.043) 
Divorced 0.057  0.061 
 (0.059)  (0.063) 
Experience      0.004
***     0.005
*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Age -0.009
*   -0.009
* 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
    
Number of obs. is 1053 
Log Likelihood = -640.21473 
chi2(11) = 109.74 
Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
The set of instruments used in this study meets the standard of Staiger and Stock. In
the ﬁrst stage of IV estimation, the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the instruments are
jointly equal to zero is rejected. The instruments have an F-statistics equal to 25.08 and
M R2 =0 .3428. All the coeﬃcients on the instruments are of the expected signs. The
coeﬃcient on the monthly change in S&P500 is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level
and is robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations. I take the ﬁtted residual from the ﬁrst stage and
estimate a probit equation in the second stage.


















Years of experience     4236.644
*** 
 (2330.750) 
Age     -2982.428
*** 
 (1792.371) 
Monthly change in S&P500      497.669
** 
 (239.324) 
S&P500 x HH Sav. & Inv.        -0.020
*** 
 (0.012) 
HH Savings & Investments   3.477
* 
 (1.113) 
HH Savings & Investments
2   0.000
* 
 (0.000) 




Number of observations  1,048 
F(13, 1034)  25.08 
R-squared 0.3428 
Prob > F  0.0000 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
Dependent variable: Household Net Worth. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Probit estimates of the eﬀect of wealth on the propensity to become an entrepreneur are
presented in Table 6. The coeﬃcient on the residual is not statistically signiﬁcant, which is
22an indication that wealth is exogenous given that the instruments are exogenous and correct.
Similarly, the coeﬃcient on wealth is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus, wealth has
an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the propensity to become an entrepreneur. This is not to say that no
entrepreneur is credit constrained. Instead, the result applies to the marginal entrepreneur.




at the mean 
(2) 
at the median 
Wealth 0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Activities -0.104
* -0.109 
 (0.029)  (0.031) 
Job   0.174
* 0.177 
 (0.049)  (0.049) 
White -0.132
* -0.142 
 (0.031)  (0.033) 
Male   0.148
* 0.147 
 (0.035)  (0.035) 
Education 0.013  0.013 
 (0.009)  (0.009) 
Married   0.109
* 0.113 
 (0.041)  (0.043) 
Divorced 0.056  0.060 
 (0.061)  (0.063) 
Experience     0.005
** 0.005 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
Age -0.009
* -0.010 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Fitted residual  0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
    
Number of observations 1048 
Log Likelihood = -636.87496 
Wald chi2(11) = 110.53 
Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
*Significant at the 1 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
From the rest of the covariates included in the probit estimation, only education and
the dummy variable for divorce are not statistically signiﬁcant. One important result of
23the probit equation is the conﬁrmation that people who already work are more likely to be
involved in a start-up. Whites are less likely to become entrepreneurs, conﬁrming results
from earlier studies. Age has a negative eﬀect, which can be explained by the age proﬁle in
t h es a m p l e .S a m p l ea g ep r o ﬁle is shown on Figure 7 in Appendix. Married people and those
with more experience are more likely to become entrepreneurs.
I further compare the group of part-time versus full-time entrepreneurs. In my sample of
1052 individuals, 663 are entrepreneurs, and from them 469 are part-timers and only 194 are
full-time entrepreneurs. These are people who spent all of their time in their businesses. I
compare the two groups in terms of demographic characteristics, household networth, savings
and investments, and income. It turns out that the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The signiﬁcance of this result is that it comes as a conﬁrmation of my previous
ﬁndings that initial wealth appears have an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the propensity to start a
new business for the marginal entrepreneur.
7 Concluding Remarks
Ie x a m i n et h ee ﬀect of initial wealth on the tendency to participate in a business start-up for
part-time entrepreneurs and argue that wealth does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the propensity
to become an entrepreneur. I develop a model of entrepreneurial choice where one can hold
an outside paid job while also being involved in a start-up. Individuals make joint decisions
of how much capital to invest and what proportion of time to spend in business.
Since part-time entrepreneurs are people who work a regular wage job some of the time
and work at their own businesses the other part of the time, one hypothesis for the existence
of part-time entrepreneurship is that people are credit constrained. They would like to
borrow enough to build their businesses and survive while the enterprise is still small. If
they cannot borrow, the only way they can get money to pay their bills is to work at a
regular job. If credit constraints are the problem, then perhaps the economy is generating
less entrepreneurship than would be ideal.
24To examine the importance of credit constraints, I estimate a reduced-form probit model.
The probability of starting a new business and wealth would be positively correlated if and
only if there are credit constraints. I deal with the potential wealth endogeneity by proposing
a new method for instrumenting wealth. I use month-to-month changes in the Standard
& Poor 500 stock market index that serve as a source of assets variation exogenous to
entrepreneurial decisions. I use a new and unique data set that provides detailed information
on how nascent entrepreneurs divide their time between their own businesses and other jobs.
The data follows both entrepreneurs and start-ups.
My empirical ﬁndings show that part-time entrepreneurs do not appear to be constrained.
This is not to say that no entrepreneur is credit constrained. It might be that a lot of part-
time business owners operate in less capital intensive sectors. Instead, the result points to
the eﬀect of wealth on the marginal entrepreneur.
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27APPENDIX 1
Proof of Proposition 1:
The entrepreneur’s desired investment and time spent in the start-up are obtained by





β + r(z − k)+w(1 − δ)
The Lagrangian for this maximization problem is:
$ = θk
αδ
β + r(z − k)+w(1 − δ) − µ1(δ − 1) + µ2δ + µ3k.








= w + µ1,
−µ1(δ − 1) = 0,µ 1 > 0,
µ2δ =0 ,µ 2 > 0,
µ3k =0 ,µ 3 > 0,
δ 6 1.
The optimal solution can be an interior solution when individuals choose to be part-time
entrepreneurs, or a corner solution when they are either full-time entrepreneurs or wage
workers. Hence, there are three possible outcomes.
Case 1: Interior solution
In this case µ1 = 0 and the necessary conditions for the optimal amount of capital and
















r and the net income can be rewritten as:
π(k
∗,δ
∗;θ)=( 1− α − β)θk
∗αδ
∗β + rs+ w.































If the production function has constant returns to scale (α + β =1 ) , the optimal factor
input ratio is still equal to α
β
w
r . However, the optimal levels k∗ and δ
∗ are not determined
and there is no rent under the optimal factor input ratio. In this case, π(k∗,δ
∗;θ)=rs+w,
or the entrepreneurial income would be the same as the wage worker’s income.
Both k∗ and δ
∗ are nonnegative, with the exception of the case when θ is zero. Thus,
to insure that all conditions hold and that (20) and (??) form the interior solution of
the maximization problem, δ
∗ must satisfy the condition 0 < δ













1−α−β < 1, or








The entrepreneurial net income is:
π(k
∗,δ












+ rz + w,
29with a positive rent from entrepreneurial ability













at the optimal levels of k and δ.
Case 2: Corner solutions
When µ1 6=0 , δ = 1. Individuals choose full-time entrepreneurship. The net income is
θkαδ
















Finally, when θ = 0, individual become wage workers only. In this case, δ =0a n dt h e
net income for a full-time wage worker is w + rz.
This model generalizes the entrepreneurial choice model developed by EJ and Xu. The
solution in the general case can be summarized in the following way:














Wage worker for θ =0
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